



THE
MILITARY DEFENCES
OF
CANADA,

CONSIDERED IN RESPECT TO OUR COLONIAL RELATIONS
WITH

GREAT BRITAIN,

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS PUBLISHED IN

THE QUEBEC "MORNING CHRONICLE,"

(Revised and corrected, with Notes and additions,)

BY

AN UPPER CANADIAN.

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I.

OUR MILITARY DEFENCES.—THE MILITIA.

To the Editor of the Morning Chronicle.

SIR,—Although the recommendations of the Military Commission, now in session, as to the best and most feasible means of organizing the military resources of the Province may undergo modifications in Parliament, it is of high import that those gentlemen should agree on a system as little open to censure as possible. There are, no doubt, many persons of excellent judgment, as well as experience, whose views would be appreciated by the Commission, but who may be prevented by diffidence or the fear of being regarded as obtrusive, from communicating their ideas to this military board. Hence there can be no impropriety in exciting a public discussion, which may call forth such opinions as I have referred to. It is with this aim that I propose to offer some remarks.

The subject, as I view it, naturally divides itself into three propositions. 1st—The organization of the land forces. 2nd—The defences of the lakes; and 3rd, (as auxiliary to these) the fortifications of the country. These I propose to consider separately in the order in which I have stated them.

On the subject of the first—the organization of the land forces of the Province—I have very decided opinions, and I may here add that I am glad to find them very well expressed in the Toronto *Leader* of the 7th instant. If the expression of these views in a leading Ministerial journal may be regarded as indicative of the policy likely to guide the gentlemen of the commission in making their report, the country will have no cause to regret their appointment.

There is one important point which must not be lost sight of—and that is the fact, that in anticipation of hostilities with our neighbors, we must rely mainly on ourselves to resist invading armies. The troops which England may be able to spare must hereafter be regarded as allies and auxiliaries. The sooner our authorities recognize this fact the better for us, and the more self-reliant shall we become.

Our system should therefore be made to conform to this view of the case—a view which British statesmen have long endeavored to impress on us by words and policy. As yet we have done little or nothing to acknowledge this policy, or to prepare for our altered relations with the mother country ; and hence we found ourselves at the commencement of the present winter, suddenly menaced with danger, and totally unprepared for any unexpected emergency. It is unjust to censure England for leaving us in such a defenceless condition, for we are ourselves wholly to blame for it.

The old proverb says, 'forewarned, forearmed.' It is fortunate for us that the 'Trent' affair occurred as it did, and at the time it did. We now see what our condition might have been had the exigencies of the great civil war between the two sections of the old Union been such as to have warranted the United States in accepting a war with England. We cannot, now, without being criminally guilty of inviting an attack next winter, or on some future occasion from our vain-glorious and ambitious neighbors any longer delay the energetic exercise of a clear and manifest duty to ourselves, our children and the empire at large. That duty is to provide the best, and in every way the most efficacious means of resisting invasion, and if necessary of carrying the war into the enemy's country. We shall thus greatly lessen the chances of war.

To accomplish either of these objects requires a well organized and efficient army. Organization requires time and practice, and England can no doubt supply us with excellent drill sergeants ; but where are we to get a supply of experienced officers to command our Canadian army ? Shall we invite the supernumeraries of the British army, if any such there be, to command our battalions and to be captains, lieutenants and ensigns ? Admitting that a sufficient supply can be had for the asking, would such a policy, carried out on a large scale, be acceptable to Canadians, or even practicable ? It is all very well to assert that there should be no invidious distinctions, but would Canadians be content to yield positions of honor and responsibility to their transatlantic brethren ? Here is a possible stumbling block which the commission will no doubt find means of avoiding. But I have been told, lately, by military gentlemen, that we have no men in the country fit to command regiments, and but few fit to fill the subordinate positions. This is a mistake that is too apt to be made by those who are strangers to the country. Canada is full of intelligent

and high spirited young gentlemen who only require to be educated in military science to make them first class officers.

How is this to be done? A few weeks ago you did me the favor to publish in your columns a letter in which I pointed this out. I then stated that in addition to the celebrated military school at West Point, there were numerous private 'military academies' in the Northern States—mostly started since the commencement of the civil war, which are conducted by old West Point men. These schools are all filled with youths who are acquiring a scientific knowledge of every branch connected with the military art. I pointed out the necessity of emulating our neighbors in this respect, and starting one, if not two, such schools in Canada, under government patronage. To those young men who may not afterwards choose, or do not have the opportunity of following a military profession, such an education will not, by any means be lost. They will come out every way improved, both physically and mentally, and be prepared to fill any position in life to which they may be called—because a course of military instruction comprises, in addition to the necessary professional studies, a thorough education in those branches that are regarded as parts of every gentleman's acquirements.

But it will no doubt be urged that the advantages proposed by providing the means of military education in the Province are too remote to merit the consideration of the commission, whilst the emergencies of the times require immediate action. This would be quite correct if the dangers which menace us were only of a temporary or limited nature. Such, however, is not the case, and we ought not to neglect the future whilst we prepare for the present. The United States must, for a long time, if not permanently, be regarded as a great military power. Whether the Confederate States succeed in establishing their independence or not, the necessity for a large standing army will remain. This imposes on us a higher degree of forecaste as to our defences, than the military status of the United States has hitherto done.

The commission will no doubt see the impolicy of placing any great reliance on our present or any future organization of the militia. The only use of a militia organization, it is to be presumed, from past experience, will be to preserve an enrolment of the men capable of and liable to service. In modern warfare discipline and excellence in

the theory and practice of the military art outweigh mere numbers. The commission will not undervalue the sort of experience which our neighbors are acquiring, and will, if possible, improve on their method of organizing the available material of the country. The great success which has attended the volunteer system in England may well suggest valuable points for our consideration. But it must not be forgotten that, as a general thing, the classes from whom these admirable military forces have been drawn are much more limited in Canada in comparison with our population. To form an efficient volunteer force of 50,000 men in Canada—a number in my judgment below the requirements of the times, if we wish to preserve peace, we must incur a considerable outlay. The men must be paid during the time deemed necessary for rifle practice—and it is only this practice that will make such a body of men valuable. Although we have many fine shots amongst our Canadian youths, they will have to acquire a different description of skill, to enable them to judge correctly of distances, and to become accurate shots beyond point blank range.

There is little doubt that many thousands would, from the novelty of the thing, turn out and learn the drill and ball practice ; and a very moderate inducement in the shape of pay might for a time suffice. There is a natural excitement attending rifle-shooting, which, whilst the novelty lasts, ought to be turned to account. But we are now told by the English press that something must be done to prevent a rapid decadence of the volunteer force of England. The *Saturday Review*, a very able and reliable journal, suggests that so valuable a means of defence should not be allowed to fall away for the want of a little of the " sinews of war." It suggests that the force be paid for the time required to keep up its efficiency. It takes a very sensible view of the principles of all military organizations which are formed for the defence of the whole community. Why should any class of men be called on to sacrifice their time and their money for an object in which all are alike interested? Besides, let it be considered, what a responsibility will attach to those who may claim the merit, or have to endure the disgrace of a break-down. The question is one which ought therefore to be well considered, and its solution placed beyond the chance of failure.

AN UPPER CANADIAN.

Quebec, 10th February, 1862.

THE DEFENCES OF THE LAKES.

SIR,—“ What is wanting in Canada is not a General, or general officers and troops, but a naval superiority on the lakes; till that superiority is established it is *impossible* to maintain an army in such a situation as to keep an enemy out of the frontiers, much less to make any conquest from them.” Such was the opinion given in his own words, of the great Duke of Wellington in 1814 just before the close of the American War.

The Governor of Michigan, in a recent message to the Legislature of that State, says : “ I think we need not so much fortifications, as a full supply of arms for the people, and a powerful marine on the lakes. Michigan is to be defended, if it comes to that, not on our own ground, but on the soil of Canada. Give us arms for the people, and the *undoubted* control of the lakes, and fortifications may safely be left to the most convenient season.”

“ Experience confirms the truth of a maxim, that the master of the sea will always acquire the dominion of the land.”—*Gibbon*.

These opinions, coinciding as they do, will scarcely be disputed by any one. It is only necessary to ascertain with accuracy the present actual condition of the balance of power on the Lakes, in order to determine what must be done by our authorities in regard thereto. In the recent report of the Military Committee in the Congress of Washington, it is asserted that the United States commercial marine on the Lakes numbers 1,200 vessels, whilst that of Canada only amounts to 300—or in the proportion of four to one against us. But this is not the worst feature of the case. They have 107 screws (which alone are available for war purposes) measuring in the aggregate 50,018 tons, and averaging 467; whilst we have but 15 with a gross tonnage of 4,562 tons and an average of 304. I have in my possession a list of the names and tonnage of 104 vessels, on these Lakes, the majority of which are screws too large to descend the Welland Canal. This list was made out in the autumn of 1860, and the average burthen may be set down at 600 tons. Since then a great number of these large

sized vessels has been added to the Upper Lake United States fleet, whilst there is not a single one of the class referred to owned in Canada. As both governments are debarred by treaty from establishing naval stations, and shipyards, or maintaining armed vessels on the lakes, the Committee of Congress relies on their powerful commercial marine, as the Government of Washington is doing to some extent in their present coast operations, for defensive and offensive war. That many of these screw steamers, could speedily be made available for such purposes has been well demonstrated by the improvised fleets so recently fitted out at New York, Boston and other ports.

This, of course, is a game at which two can play. But do we hold the cards? If we do not how are we to get them? Our neighbors, moreover claim that Lake Michigan, being wholly an American Lake, is exempt from the stipulations of the treaty, and the authorities of that State have sent agents to Washington to urge the propriety of building a number of war vessels at Grand Haven and other points on the Lake, and to form a regular ship yard, and naval station at some of the ports in Michigan.

Every body knows or ought to know what has given our neighbors the commercial supremacy of the Lakes, and yet our merchants either from apathy, or want of capital and enterprize have scarcely put forth a feeble effort to counteract these obvious causes. Prior to 1825 the whole trade of the West found its way to market by the St. Lawrence. The opening of the Erie Canal in that year caused an immediate diversion of the rising commerce of the Lakes to New York, and at the same time added such a stimulant to the settlement of the Western States, that from a population of about a million in the whole of them—including Ohio, they have increased to 7,000,000 and the trade has kept pace with the population.

To counteract this state of things our Provincial Government set to work and built the magnificent system of canals which overcome the rapids of our river and form a navigation of almost infinitely superior capacity. There was one mistake committed in the design of these truly grand works. The Canal which connects the lower with the four great upper lakes, the shores of which are the granaries of the West, is of smaller magnitude except as regards depth, than those of the St. Lawrence. This circumstance has, until recently, interposed an insuperable obstacle to our entering into successful competition, for the trade of those

Western Lakes. It has been demonstrated within the last two years, that we can, as regards the grain trade, which is the chief commerce of the West, make our short lines of railway available as connecting links between the upper and lower navigation. This is due to the wonderful economy of "handling" the grain by means of steam elevators, and to the inclination of the gradients in the direction of the trade.

My remarks, however, thus far mainly apply to the Upper Lakes. I have one or two to make respecting the trade of Western Canada, the bulk of which has been drawn to New York, although our St. Lawrence canals have been completed for nearly twenty years. It is certainly a strong reflection on the spirit and energy of our merchants, and especially those of Quebec, that they have not yet built a single freight vessel up to the capacity of those canals. Whilst our neighbors are able to maintain almost a monopoly of the Western trade, through their "ditch" of a canal, we with our magnificent lakes, canals, and river, have looked on in stupid amazement at the strange phenomenon. But after all there is no mystery about the matter. The circumstance of New York being a larger ocean freight market, taken in connection with the greater size and economy of their upper lake vessels, more than counterbalances the drawback of their smaller canals. If we think it worth while to enter into competition on a large scale, for this trade, thus to regain or divide the control of the lakes with the Americans, we must establish lines of screw freight vessels on the upper lakes, as well as on Lake Ontario, to run in connection with the several railways connecting these waters—and these vessels must meet other and more economical freight steamers at Montreal and Quebec than those subsidized to carry the mails. But first of all let us attend to the inland necessities and the ship-owners and merchants of England will provide the ocean craft. When this is done we shall impose additional motives on our Western neighbors to preserve the peace. Chicago, Milwaukie, Detroit and the cities of Western Canada will then meet London, Liverpool and Glasgow at Montreal and Quebec, instead of at New York.

It is all very well, in speaking of the defences of the Lakes, to rely on the numerous gunboats of England, provided they can be got in position in time of need. If a war unfortunately arises out of the present volcanic influences at work on American society, I venture to say that the English gunboats will not be in the right place at the right time, if they get there at all. Besides, England will need them all

to blockade two thousand miles of a sea coast, where none but vessels of light draft can impose an effectual blockade. If we sincerely desire to obtain maritime supremacy on our great inland waters, we must do so by entering on a new race of competition for the Western trade, in the manner I have pointed out. The history of the world demonstrates that maritime power has invariably followed, and not preceded, commercial greatness. The merchant navy has in all ages and countries been the school for the sailors who have manned the war navies.

Let Canada not ignore this principle—a principle that has raised England to the highest pitch of maritime renown. Besides to encourage the establishment of a commercial navy on our inland waters will effect both objects in view. Money so laid out does not lie dead or inactive capital. It is like the seed cast on the waters, which in due time bringeth forth a rich harvest. If our merchants have not the necessary capital, let such assistance be offered as may lead to an early and powerful demonstration towards regaining for the St. Lawrence her natural and indefeasible rights. Are not the Western American merchants clamorous for the very improvements I have hinted at? Do they not frequently intimate, that, if Canada belonged to the Union they would speedily enrich our Atlantic ports with the vastly increased stream of commerce, which they would pour through the St. Lawrence? It is time that such a reproach was wiped away.

The truth is, that the capital of New York has built up the United States' Western trade, and the capital of England has been poured with a lavish hand into the lap of New York, until she has grown insolent in her unparalleled prosperity. Her clipper ships swarm in every sea, and her merchants trade in every port. English companies are formed to supply inland vessels for India and China, and Brazil, but Canada is regarded as a hyperborean region, chiefly celebrated for its products of timber. It is not considered that, although the St. Lawrence is closed five months in the year, the Erie Canal which carries 80 per cent of the western traffic, is likewise closed an equal length of time; nor can it be known that Upper Canada produces a million quarters of wheat for foreign export, and that more than half of this goes to enrich the New York canals and ship-owners.

AN UPPER CANADIAN.

Quebec, 11th Feb., 1862.

III.

THE DEFENCES OF THE COUNTRY.— FORTIFICATIONS.

“ Britannia needs no bulwarks,
No towers along the steep ;
Her march is o'er the mountain wave,
Her home is on the deep.”

[Patriotic song.]

“ The experience of the world from China to Britain has exposed the vain attempt of fortifying an extensive tract of country. An active enemy who can select and vary his points of attack, must in the end discover some feeble spot, or some unguarded moment. The strength as well as the attention of the defenders is divided.”—[Gibbon's Decline and Fall.]

The experience of past faults, which may sometimes correct the mature age of individuals, is seldom profitable to the successive generations of mankind.”—[Idem.]

As we are about entering on a new epoch in our national progress—an epoch which will be noted by the future historian of Canada and the Empire, it may serve some good purpose to ventilate those important questions at present engaging so large a share of public attention—questions in fact of momentous importance. In approaching a subject on which there has often been great differences of opinion, even amongst professional men, it will be more becoming an unprofessional writer to weigh opposing views and arguments, than to express a decided judgment. One class of persons will be found condemning fortifications almost in *toto*; whilst another, with equal obstinacy, declares them to be indispensable to the safety of a country. The scientific and public opinion of mankind will also be found to have fluctuated from age to age, on this vexed question. It was once the boast of Sparta that the smoke of an enemy's watch-fire had never been visible from their capital, and the bravest race of warriors the world ever saw, held stone walls in utter contempt. There is no country, perhaps, where the question of fortifications has been more discussed and where the views of great authorities have differed more widely than in our own beloved mother country. Each successive improvement in the military art has brought out new points, requiring attention. At one time stone walls have risen high in public favor. At another there was nothing like the “ wooden walls of old England.” Very

recently, a first Lord of the Admiralty, at a public demonstration given to the first Admiral of England, on the eve of his departure for the Baltic, felt it necessary to restrain his supposed rashness of character by admonishing him to be careful of England's ships, and to beware of the stone walls of Russia. That Admiral, at the close of the season, after having but too faithfully observed his superior's admonition, returned home amidst the clamors of the nation and the jeers of the press. When parliament met, he turned on his assailants and brought them to bay, by quoting his instructions and demonstrating the folly of attacking stone walls with wooden ships. His bravery was vindicated, and the nation set to work to meet the now acknowledged difficulty which presented itself to the power of the Empire. The result has been the production of the iron *Warrior*. Alas for the "wooden walls!" their glory and their might have departed. Hereafter, an iron age will require iron walls, and the future poet will sing of the "Iron walls of old England."*

France and America follow in the wake of England, and the time is at hand when the battles of the sea will be contested between iron navies, propelled at enormous speed by the giant steam. If Sir Charles Napier were living, he might now bid defiance to Cronstadt—whose walls could be made to crumble before the tremendous missiles sent with almost unerring aim, from an impregnable floating iron battery, which, by changing its position under dexterous management, is able to avert the effects of the enemy's fire. Stone walls, like wooden walls, have had their day. This fact may be noted as historical. It is therefore to be presumed, that the Imperial commission, now sitting on the question

* About a month after the publication of this letter the Naval engagement at Newport News took place, affording the first practical illustration of the efficiency of iron clad Steamers. The iron plated Steamer *Merrimac* (a razeed, 50 gun ship) mounting ten heavy guns and in no respect equal to the *Warrior*, attacked four U. S. frigates, the *Cumberland* of 24 guns, the *Congress* of 50 guns, the *St. Lawrence* of 50 guns, and the *Minnesota* of 40 guns—164 guns in all. She first ran into and sunk the *Cumberland*, and then engaged captured and burned the *Congress*, and would have destroyed the others had night not put an end to the battle. These and other vessels in the port were saved, on the renewal of the attack next morning, by the timely arrival of Captain Ericssons new, turreted iron clad Steamer *Monitor* mounting two 180 lb. guns, which engaged the *Merrimac* at close quarters for several hours and finally drove her off.

The New York Herald of the 12th March speaking of this, engagement says "henceforth not a single wooden war vessel must be built. We are indeed entering upon an age of iron—iron in ships, iron in forts, iron in harbor defences, iron in everything that moves, or floats."

of fortifications in Canada, will learn by "the experience of past faults" and I may add present knowledge, not to sink any more money in the construction of stone fortifications. If bomb-proof works are required at particular points for strategic reasons, nothing but iron can be relied on ; and for temporary protection good earth-works, well flanked by heavy oak timber, if it can be had.

As I never allow myself, from motives of contempt or prejudice, to refuse to draw instruction from our neighbors, who are practising the art of war on each other, I venture to point attention to the successful application of railway bars to defensive purposes. This new discovery in fortifications is due to the ingenuity or the necessities of the *Charlestonians*. It was from behind such an improvised fortress, that the celebrated Fort Sumpter was reduced to submission.* Why not then apply the principle so efficacious as it is believed to be in ocean batteries, to land works ? Its application would be much cheaper on land than on water. Oak timber, two feet square, can be put together and plated on land, far more economically than the building and adapting a great ship to the same principle. These, however, are matters which have no doubt long since occupied the attention of the Imperial authorities ; and I may, after all, be incompetent to offer advice on a question that has so much puzzled professional men. From the fact that England is laying out fabulous sums of money at this very time in building stone walls for the defences of her coasts, I infer that I must be wrong.

Speaking of the coast defences of England, I would observe, that I happened to be in London at the time the subject was receiving consideration, in and out of parliament, and must say I could not help thinking that those who condemned the lavish expenditure of money for these objects, at a time when the whole system of warfare was rapidly changing, had the best of the argument. It is true that the *Warrior* was not yet completed ; but a delay of one or two years could not have made much difference. It so happened that the whole British nation was laboring under a panic about a French invasion, and the government thought it best not to assume the responsibility of delay. It seems strange, however, now, that new light is shed on the science of naval architecture, by the reported success of the *Warrior*.

* The deck or roof of the *Merrimac*, was coveded with railway bars at the recent battle, and the 32 pound shot glanced off them like "peas from a pop-guns"

and *La Gloire*, some material modifications are not promptly made in the mode of constructing coast defences. £12,000,000 sterling would build a great many *Warriors*, which after all will have to be built, before the perfect safety of England can be assured. The advantages of floating iron batteries are too numerous and too important, to be overlooked or denied. But the dock yards must be defended by land works—so say the great professional authorities. This is no doubt quite correct, because they may be assailed by an enemy superior in the field, who may choose his own point of landing. England, however, ought never to allow an enemy to land in force, and that is just what we in Canada ought to provide against. Let us have the power, or the means at hand of creating such a power, on our lakes, as will enable us to resist invasion until England can send to our aid her iron batteries and gunboats.

I feel certain that I may venture, without presumption, to say, that I conceive that the best fortifications we can construct, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, will be a goodly number of first-class screw merchantmen on our Lakes capable of being converted into gunboats, and a well organized army of volunteers.

AN UPPER CANADIAN.

Quebec, 13th Feb. 1862.

IV.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COLONIAL DEFENCE—THE QUESTION OF COST.

SIR,—I am sure that every right-minded Canadian must, in the main, agree with your judicious remarks on Thursday and Saturday last, on this subject. The difficulty to which you refer, namely, the mode of settling the proportion of the burthens which shall be borne respectively, by the mother country and the Province—a term which I prefer to colony when speaking of Canada—is by no means a new one. It has often been discussed, both here and in England, with a view to arriving at some general understanding. Its importance at the present time, however, is very materially enhanced by the possibility of a war arising out of the present American complications—either on account of Imperial interests and considerations, or by a deliberate attempt on the part of the Government of Washington or of armed bodies of disbanded soldiers to subjugate this country.*

The question is so large a one, and has recently been so fully investigated by a Committee of the House of Commons, resulting in a blue-book of truly formidable dimensions, that it is difficult to bring it within the compass of a newspaper article. Before offering any observations on it, it may be as well to explain what has been the theory and practice of late, in reference to this and the other North American Provinces. This cannot, perhaps, be more briefly stated than

* The danger to be apprehended from the disbanding of large armies, has been frequently illustrated both in ancient and modern history. Gibbon speaking on this subject says “too idle to work, too poor to beg, “ the mercenaries” (of the middle ages), “ were accustomed a to life of rapine ; “ they could act with more dignity and effect, under a banner and a chief ; “ and the sovereign, to whom their service was useless and their presence “ impertinute endeavored to discharge the torrent against some neighboring “ countries. Macaulay says, “the peace” (of Ryswick) “ had, all over Europe, “ and no where more than in England, turned crowds of old soldiers into “ marauders.”

The several Fillibuster expeditions got up a few years ago in the U. S. to subdue Cuba and central America were traceable directly to the discharged soldiers, employed for a single year by the government of Washington, in the Mexican war. What will happen when the vast armies of the present civil war shall be left without an occupation remains to be seen. A terrible power is in the course of creation and there will not be wanting “ a banner and a chief” to direct it against “ some neighboring countries.”

in the words of Mr. Elliot, Assistant Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, before this Committee. Referring to the arrangements with the North American Provinces on the question of military defence, propounded by Lord Grey in 1851, and subsequently by the Duke of Newcastle and Sir George Grey in 1854, and Mr. Labouchere in 1856, Mr. Elliot, says, "the plan was that there should be a certain *maximum* force, which should be there on Imperial account " and paid for out of Imperial funds; and that *if the Colony wanted a greater number of troops they should pay for their charge.*"

To meet this altered state of things our present militia system was adopted, which has furnished a volunteer force—the only branch of the militia establishment in the Province of the least value, (as correctly stated by Mr. Elliot in the course of his examination). This force Mr. Elliot sets down for Canada at 4456, (page 22 of report). The *maximum* Imperial force thought necessary at that time, (10th of April last), just at the commencement of the American Civil War, was stated at 2220 of all arms. The extraordinary events which have occurred on this Continent since that time, illustrate the impossibility of laying down any fixed rule in regard to the proportions of military force to be provided by any particular group of Colonies. It ought to go far to demonstrate that not only each particular Colony, but that every fresh exigency must be dealt with on its merits.

As I am not writing a treatise on the subject, it will not be necessary to discuss the peculiar opinions of Mr. Adderley, M. P., who has given voluminous evidence, and published a pamphlet and recently a speech, to prove that England ought to go back to the Colonial system of 100 years ago, which threw all the cost of defence on the colonists. That an Imperial statesman, of Mr. Adderley's standing, should revert to a state of things when the only defences required by the North Americans were against the natives of the Continent, or the then distant colonies of France, must be quite refreshing to those who believe that "there is nothing new under the sun," and that all things revolve in cycles. An ingenious theorist, not a very long time ago, wrote an essay to prove that bows and arrows—such as were used by the ancient Britons, and are still in favor with certain savage nations, who know not the use of fire-arms—were the best weapons for a warlike people. Mr. Adderley's theory of Colonial policy may fairly be

classed with that in favor of a return to bows and arrows. But as the bow and the arrow are not likely to change position with the Enfield rifle, so neither is Mr. Adderley's Colonial policy likely to prevail—at least in Canada. Nor can it be supposed that Earl Grey's "plan," though it has been indorsed by a series of Colonial ministers, and differs little from Mr. Adderley's, will be available any longer in British North America. Neither can Canada be properly treated as belonging to the "group" of North American colonies to which a uniform principle of any kind can be applied.

The "Lower Provinces" of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Prince Edward's Island, being more especially maritime Provinces may continue to be so grouped, and may have some uniform plan settled on, as to the cost of defence, whether in time of peace, or in time of war. What all the North American Provinces have most to apprehend, is war with the United States. As regards Canada, her long inland frontier, which is distinguished only by an imaginary line drawn through the lakes and rivers, or by the monuments set up by the surveyors—her case is different from the others of the same Colonial office group.

The attacks to which the Lower or maritime Provinces would, in the event of war with the United States, be subject, would be merely of a predatory nature—such as the landing at some undefended point, of marines from a ship of war or privateersman, to plunder, or destroy property. The United States in the face of so powerful a navy as England can bring to bear on the American coasts, it cannot be supposed, will attempt to land an army on the shores of any of the maritime Provinces proper. Their land forces would therefore be wholly directed against Canada. By far the best mode of defending these Lower Provinces would be that adopted for the coast defence of England, Scotland and Ireland during the Russian war—namely by effectually shutting up every port of the enemy, and capturing or destroying every armed ship of his, which may have the temerity to keep outside, if this can be done. There being no common principle on which to found a plan for arranging the proportion of expenses to be borne respectively by the mother country and the whole of the North American Provinces, it becomes quite unnecessary to make further allusion to the Lower group. For us the question is purely Canadian; and must be settled between this country and England on high national principles and according to the peculiar cir-

cumstances and interests which may have produced a resort to arms.

Having pointed out the impracticability of "grouping the Colonies" for Colonial office convenience, in such emergencies as the present, and alluded to the circumstances growing out of boundary and geographical position, which are peculiar to Canada, we may fairly find a starting point from which we may possibly arrive at a solution of the question now before the English and Canadian public—namely, what shall hereafter be the relations between the Province and the mother country, and from this deduce the proportion which each shall bear in the defence of common interests. In my first letter I stated it as my view of the subject that we must henceforth, for these purposes, be regarded as allies, and that when the Province is threatened with invasion the forces of England would in effect become auxillaries to those of Canada, just as a Canadian regiment sent to assist England in some foreign war would obtain for us similar designations. By divesting ourselves of mere ideas and sentiments, which may be embodied in particular expressions of language, we may often find the solution of a difficult problem. Although "a rose by any other name may smell as sweet," we prefer to call it a rose—that being the name most proper for it. But if by any process of nature, or art, a rose should be turned into a tulip, it would be very improper to still call it a rose, and our doing so would only lead to confusion in the science of floriculture.

Now, if the relations of a Colony with the mother country, being *sui generis*, have, from circumstances become changed to those of an ally we shall gain much by so considering them. Great inconvenience often arises, in the discussion of questions, which do not admit of scientific demonstration, by the use of inappropriate terms, and the force of great moral axioms may be lessened or altogether lost by a wrong application of language.

To apply these observations, I assume it as an established and admitted fact, that Canada having grown into national proportions, and assumed certain independent functions, occupies a different relationship towards the parent State, from that which she held in her incipient stages of colonization, or nonage, must now prepare for the new responsibilities which are devolved on her. It has, to some extent, been the policy of British statesmen to urge on us the assumption of these responsibilities, (see Earl Grey's Despatch of 1851,) and now we can no longer avoid doing so. In

considering those relations in the light of an alliance offensive, and defensive we open up a large question—namely, how far a colony may be bound to assist the Mother country in cases of need? The Greek colonies of antiquity were always regarded as allies, and went by that name. They were virtually independent of the parent state, which never interfered in local, or domestic concerns. And yet no people were ever more loyal to the common head than the colonies of ancient Greece. They gloried in the name of Greek, for centuries after the prestige of Greece had departed, and gave their blood to support the honor and the interests of the common brotherhood.¹ Such ought to be the relationship between all the branches of the great Anglo-Saxon family, and such probably would be the case now, but for that unfortunate policy which Mr. Adderley so much advises, and which led to the separation of the old colonies of North America from the Mother country.² Mr. Adderley, I may here remark, seems to have shifted his ground considerably, since he gave his evidence only a few months ago, before the Committee of which he was a member. His late speech, is, to some

1.—GREEK COLONIES—“The great bulk of the Greek Colonies were really independent; and though they commonly regarded the land of their forefathers with filial respect, though they yielded to its citizens the place of distinction at public games and religious ceremonies, and were expected to assist them in time of war, they did so as *allies only*, on fair and equal terms but *never as subjects*.”

ROMAN COLONIES—“The Roman Colonies were, for the most part, founded by and under the authority of government; being intended to serve both as outlets for poor and discontented citizens, and as military stations, or garrisons. The most intimate political union was always maintained between them and the Mother City. Their internal government was modeled on that of Rome; and while their superior officers were mostly sent from the capital, they were made to contribute their full quota of troops and taxes to assist in carrying on the contests in which the Republic was almost constantly engaged.”

MODERN COLONIES.—“The early Colonies of most modern nations were founded by private adventurers, influenced either by the hope of gain, or by a desire to escape religious persecution, without any wish to relieve the Mother Country of a surplus population or bridle subjugated Provinces. On their first institution, therefore, the modern colonies approached, though with some essential variations, more nearly to the Grecian than to the Roman model—but the period of their freedom was of very limited duration. They were soon subjugated to laws and regulation framed in the Metropolis, and calculated, as was to be supposed rather to promote, its interests than those of the Colony. At a later period the foundation of colonial establishments was eagerly patronized by most European governments, in the view of extending commerce and enriching the Mother Country, by securing to her the exclusive possession of the market of distant countries.”—*McCulloch.*

2.—The old colonies threw off their allegiance to Britain because British Statesmen attempted to tax them for their own defences. Would Canada act differently, if Mr. Adderley had the power to put her to the test?

extent an attempt to reconcile his peculiar views to the important events which have recently happened. But it will not interest a Canadian, and will prove only a waste of time to point out his discrepancies.

From these observations, it appears to me that the following considerations may be deduced:

1st. That it will be difficult if not impossible to determine how much of any *casus belli*, may be chargeable to Imperial and how much to Provincial account—speaking now for Canada alone. This difficulty must necessarily arise from the impossibility of ascertaining the true motives of an enemy—inasmuch as some pretext instead of the true cause is generally set forth, by one, if not by both parties. No body believes that France and England went to war with Russia, on account of the quarrel between Russia and Turkey about the Greek churches at Jerusalem. And yet that was the pretext put forward by one of the belligerent parties, as the sole cause of the quarrel, and entered largely into the declarations of the allies. So, if the United States, having a furtive eye on Canada, seek a quarrel with England, it will almost certainly be about something else not having the slightest reference to Canada. This proves 2ndly, the impolicy of discussing, in advance the question as to whether a future war may be undertaken on account of Imperial, or Provincial interests.

If we are going to measure our loyalty and our aid by such considerations, England may well weigh the propriety of casting us off altogether, as a source of weakness, rather than of strength in time of war—especially with our neighbors. Let us well consider this view of the question, before deciding on a niggardly and unstatesmanlike policy. But, for Canada, England would rely wholly on her navy in case of an American war. She would thus be able to damage her enemy more than her enemy could damage her and at an enormous saving to the Imperial Exchequer. In such a war, it must be evident to every man of common sense, that *Canada will be England's vulnerable point*; and, if we are going to open a balance account we ought to take into that account what it will cost to maintain our independence, if that can be done at all, if England were to adopt the same narrow view and cast us off, to shift for ourselves.

If then, we agree on the soundness of this “theory,” our government should endeavor to put it into practice, even if they have to call on our people to submit to a little direct taxation to meet the present and future exigencies of the

country. We may differ amongst ourselves as to the nature and probable duration of the dangers we are now called on to avert. One man may think 10,000, another 20,000, and a third 50,000 enrolled and drilled volunteers may be sufficient, or necessary to stave off the disasters of war. In considering this question, it may well be affirmed that it is better to err on the safe side. One, two, or three millions promptly and judiciously expended, may save a future outlay of ten, twenty, or thirty millions in defending our shores from the disasters of war. This moderate present expenditure may now fairly be asked for, by England, and ought to be cheerfully and promptly responded to by Canada—and the proportions, in case of war, may safely be left till such a contingency becomes inevitable. It may then be settled by a convention, similar to that entered into by France and England when they went to war with Russia—a convention that constituted them allies in regard to that particular war, and which has made them friends ever since.

AN UPPER CANADIAN.

Quebec, 15th February, 1862.

OUR DEFENCES FURTHER CON- SIDERED.

SIR,—Our present relief from the apprehension of war has been accidental. It may well become us to consider whether our dangers are not still pressing, and may not become perpetual ; and if so, whether we ought not to put forth, for a time, extraordinary efforts to guard against them. During the continuance of the American civil war, from whence the elements of danger have sprung, we may not have much to apprehend. But we cannot tell at what moment, or by what unforeseen event that war may be terminated by a peace between the two sections. The Southerners are beginning to be more severely pressed, and would probably accept reasonable terms from their old Confederates. Or let us suppose the Federal arms to prevail. in either case, three quarters of a million of men who have acquired some knowledge as well as some taste of war, will have to find the means of livelihood in a country, whose commercial and financial condition will have become greatly deranged. The Government of Washington must, in any case, for many years to come, maintain a standing army of at least 100,000 men. It will every year add to its navy ; and knowing as we do, the reckless enterprize and daring of our neighbors, it would be incredible folly to trust our defences henceforth to a few thousand British troops, though they be the best and the bravest in the world. But I need not dwell on this point. The necessity of adopting efficient measures is fully admitted by all classes in the Province. We have only to determine the nature and extent of the defences to be provided, and to supply the means for carrying them into effect.

I know nothing of the determination of the Militia Commission, if they have arrived at any and merely give my views to the public for what they are worth. The Commissioners, will, no doubt, deal with the question in a lucid and comprehensive manner. But the public opinion of the Province must, after all, determine whether the recommendations of those gentlemen shall obtain sufficient vitality to meet the present and future requirements of the country. As a member of that public, and I trust a true hearted Canadian and

a good subject of Her Majesty, I have ventured to urge the propriety of establishing a military school for the education of young Canadians in military science. Now is a favorable time to carry this important desideratum into effect.

In the view I am taking, and looking forward as I do to a long future, I discard altogether the idea of offering a Provincial subsidy for Imperial troops to defend our frontiers from attack. Although the practice has been adopted in regard to New South Wales, Ceylon and Mauritius, I cannot conceive that Canadian statesmen will make such a proposition to England, nor is it to be believed that England would adopt it, if it were made. Such a practice, to use the words of the Right Hon. Robert Lowe, before the Committee of the House of Commons last summer, would be "putting the British troops more in the position of mercenaries, than, if I were a soldier myself I should like. They are virtually serving a foreign Government which hires them from the Government which they are bound to serve." I may further add that such an arrangement, if agreed to, would prove utterly unequal to our present and probable future requirements. England will send us every available soldier she has, in case of need, and will pour out her treasure as freely as ever. Canada ought not, and must not, contribute in money but in armed, drilled and fully equipped men to the extent of her ability, or in such numbers as shall be settled by a convention, when such a measure becomes necessary.

What we have, therefore, to consider is, how we shall provide these men. Shall it be in the shape of a small standing army—for we are too poor to recruit and maintain a large one? Or shall it be by a larger volunteer force, which shall be fully armed, uniformed and taught the practice of the rifle? Which force will prove most valuable in case of war? How many regulars can be maintained for a given sum—say of a million of dollars a year, or such an amount as we may feel ourselves equal to providing? How many volunteers would the same sum keep up in time of peace? These are questions which enter into the very essence of the whole discussion.

I have favored the volunteer principle for many reasons, some of which I will now briefly allude to. First. What we want, is to develop the military resources and spirit of the Canadian people.—This is rendered indispensable by our proximity to a powerful neighbor, who has put in requisition every available military expedient he possesses to quell

a great civil war, and I must take leave to say, that on the development of this spirit depends the future safety of our country. Secondly. This neighbor must, for many years, if not for all future time, remain a great military power, and in consequence, a dangerous neighbor. The necessity for having a body of Canadian regulars, in order to add firmness and impose confidence amongst the great body of irregulars, which, after all, must do a large share of the fighting, will be obviated by the presence of a considerable imperial force, whose prestige and discipline cannot be equalled. Thirdly. We can, for the same money, keep in a tolerably efficient state of organization during peace ten times (the Commission on Imperial Defences of 1860 say twenty times) as many volunteers as we can of regulars. Supposing, therefore, for the sake of comparison, the proportions to be ten to one, we may well consider whether 50,000 trained volunteers will not go further to impress our neighbors with sentiments of respect for us than 5,000 regulars. I know the contempt the Duke of Wellington had for irregulars. But his opinions were formed in regard to the Portuguese. Again I would ask, would not the 50,000 armed and drilled volunteer soldiers more fully demonstrate the determination and spirit of our people, and exercise a higher moral influence than a standing army of 5,000 strong? These questions carry their own answers.

But, whether we are to have a standing army or a volunteer army, we must aim at making it as efficient as possible, in its way. The first necessity is to have good officers. Without these, all military organization becomes a mockery and a useless outlay of public money. The men may be taught their drill by experienced sergeants from the line, but the officers can only acquire a knowledge of their duties and of the science of war by long training in some competent school. It is obvious that we cannot send a sufficient number of our promising youths to England to acquire this knowledge. We must, therefore, from the necessity of the case provide the means to secure this object at home. Perhaps it may not be desirable that the Province should expend at once a large sum, in providing these means, nor that every military aspirant should be qualified to command an army, or even a regiment. What we want is to make a beginning, and to establish a system which may be enlarged on, whereby Canadians may qualify in Canada for at least a limited number of those higher positions, in which such qualifications are absolutely indispensable to efficiency. There may,

if necessary, be different degrees of education, and the schools themselves may be attached to the colleges and universities of the Province, by creating military professor-ships. Where early indications of military aptitude present themselves, such youths might be selected for the higher honors and a higher class of qualifications. These are details, but details of the highest importance, and they are thrown out as suggestions which court investigation from every candid enquirer into our present and futures condition, as a people.—Amongst the ancient Romans a military education was considered a necessary part of every gentleman's acquirements, and there is no good reason why an art, now become so important to the liberties of our country, should not be taught by competent masters in all our higher places of instruction.

Though these observations are made from a Canadian point of view, I trust that I have not, as too many imperialists, and perhaps too many provincialists have done, forgotten the opposite side of the question. Opinions not based on large and even generous principles, of mutual advantage ought to be regarded as unworthy of consideration.

It will, no doubt, have been remarked that the question of the contingents to be provided by the respective Governments has been left without a suggestion as to its solution. This question as, I observed in a former letter, had better be left until a necessity for its solution arises. Up on this point, England has done her duty to herself and to us, by the costly and successful effort she has made to send out reinforcements. We are the delinquents, and it is not for us to raise such a question. I admit that there has been quite a demonstration in our towns, and some thousands of our best men have enrolled themselves in companies, and are learning the drill. But what proportion of these could leave their counting houses and desks or other avocations, and march to the extreme ends of the Province if required? Eighty per cent of our population is composed of agriculturalists, and it is to this class, that we must, after all, look for the bulk of our future military force. What has been done to organize officer and drill them? Does not all still depend on the action of the Legislature, which will not assemble for another month? By the slowness of our movement and the consequent delay we shall gain one advantage—time for deliberation, and this is what I think ought to be improved.

It is perhaps, needless to observe that the organization of our military and naval forces, whatever they may consist

of, must at present be regarded merely in the light of a peace establishment—but a peace establishment created to meet the requirements of an exceedingly uncertain future. If war comes, we will have to draw from such resources, as we may have created in time of peace, the means, to be used conjointly with the forces of England, in protecting our shores from invasion and our homes from destruction. The peace establishment should therefore be commensurate with the objects which it is intended to effect. Though England may speedily increase her ten, or twelve thousand men, of all arms to 30,000 or 40,000, can we make 20,000 partially drilled and equipped volunteers into 50,000 tolerable soldiers at such short notice? If we are invaded, it will not be by a handful of men; and if our object is to preserve peace, let us not by the weakness of our efforts invite an attack.

AN UPPER CANADIAN.

Quebec, 18th February, 1862.

VI.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COLONIAL DEFENCE.

SIR,—It has afforded me much satisfaction, in reading your remarks on my suggestions, to find that we so cordially agree on the main question—namely, the necessity of our meeting in a reciprocal spirit the liberality of England in supplying the means of rendering our defences effectual. On other points, our difference is rather seeming than real. I am inclined to say that we substantially agree and that our apparent difference of opinion is only in the use, or substitution of words.

There are one or two observations, however, in my letter (No. 4,) that appeared in yesterday's number of your paper, which I think you have misconceived, perhaps from want of clearness of expression on my part. The first of these is where you have arrived at the conclusion that my views, after all, differ but little from those of Mr. Adderley, M.P., in regard to Colonial policy. You will therefore permit me to make myself better understood. To do so, I will state briefly what that gentleman proposed to the Committee of the House of Commons on "Colonial Military Expenditure," of which he was a member. His proposition was made in the shape of a series of resolutions one or two of which I will quote, as being sufficient to explain his policy.

1. "That every part of the empire which has representative government should provide the requirements for its own safety.

2. "That the mother country is bound to aid her colonies in wars, especially in those which may be the consequence of her own policy.

3. "And may expect in return the co-operation of her colonies, especially in wars which concern themselves."

4. Mr. Adderley further proposes that the Imperial Government shall encourage a "gradual return to the old Colonial system of this country, during the continuance of which "British troops were never employed in Colonies for any "purpose, but that of aid against foreign enemies in time of "war."

I have numbered these propositions for the convenience of reference. As to numbers two and three, taken as af-

firming abstract principles, I do not see that any exception can be taken to them. With regard to number one, it strikes me as being inconsistent with number two. It certainly differs widely from the views I have urged. For instance, I have taken the ground that all general and abstract principles fail when applied to particular colonies and particular cases, which may arise. I have been offering suggestions in reference to Canada alone. It would be presumption in me to offer opinions about other colonies, and to manifest a desire to intermeddle in matters about which Canadians cannot be expected to possess more than a general knowledge.

Acting on this idea, I have pointed out the impropriety of applying the same principles and means of defence to the lower North American Provinces and to Canada. The maritime Provinces, I contend, must be defended mainly by the navy of England—whilst Canada must be secured against attack by a powerful land force and a powerful fleet of gun-boats on the Lakes. I do not propose, nor do I think anything I have written can be construed into such a meaning, to "sever Canada from the Lower Provinces," or to urge a "policy without reference to them." I have simply distinguished between the policy applicable to them as maritime Provinces and that which is imposed on us, by geographical and strategical considerations. Having drawn this distinction I confined my observations to Canada.

Between Mr. Adderley's recommendation number four, and my suggestions, there is a wide divergence. So far from there being "little essential difference between our propositions," I have endeavored to point out an utter disagreement. Mr. Adderley's proposition would leave us to-day without a British soldier in the country, because we happen to be at peace with our neighbors. My proposition is, always to have such a British force in the Province, as will, conjointly with our own forces of whatever kind, command the respect of our neighbors and thus avert war altogether. Is there no difference in these propositions I would ask? If not, I confess myself a very poor master of language.

There is, in my judgment, more similarity between the late Colonial office policy and Mr. Adderley's as expounded by Mr. Elliot the assistant Secretary of State for the Colonies. Mr. Elliott states this plan to be, to maintain "a certain *maximum* force, which should be there on Imperial account and paid out of Imperial funds, and that if the *Colony wanted a greater number of troops they should pay for their charge.*"

In quoting this explanation of the old Colonial office policy, I have italicised those passages which appeared to me to be objectionable. It seems to me to have been a very loose sort of arrangement, and one which might have led to serious disasters in this Province. I have already pointed out the fallacy of attempting to apply a general rule to all the Colonies, or to particular groups of them. In doing so, I have only followed the recommendation of the Committee of the House of Commons. who say, "taking into consideration the facts disclosed by the evidence laid before them, "your Committee are of opinion that no uniform rule can be laid down which will be applicable alike to communities so various as those, which compose the British Colonial Empire." The Committee distinguish between those dependencies which are regarded in the light of military stations, and such as are "colonies" proper, and advise that each of the latter shall be dealt with, in regard to the expenses of military defences, according to the exigencies of the case and the times, "having regard to the local resources of each." The report then goes on to say "with this reservation, it appears to your Committee that the responsibility and cost of the military defence of such dependencies *ought mainly to devolve on themselves.*"

Whilst I am at the "blue book," I take the liberty to quote one more passage to show that I have followed pretty closely in the footsteps of the illustrious statesmen who composed the Committee of last year. The Report further says, "that it is inexpedient that the proportions of cost of Colonial defence to be borne by the Imperial and Colonial governments respectively, should be the subject of negotiations with the various dependencies." I may make an observation or two on this point again; but I desire first to remark, that I do not think that British statesmen have shown so much forethought in regard to the peculiar position of Canada and the peculiar dangers to which she is exposed as they might have done. Stretching as the Province does, from the head of Lake Superior to the New Brunswick line fully two thousand miles along the borders of a powerful and perhaps covetous neighbor, Canada never ought to have been classed with other members of the Colonial empire in regard to her defences. British statesmen ought to have considered this great Province as presenting by far the most vulnerable part of the Empire, in case of a rupture with that neighbor, and should have regarded our defences, both on the land and on the lakes, as in the nature of Imperial de-

fences, and Canada ought to have done her part to the reasonable extent of her ability. Had this view prevailed—had England looked at the question in this light, and considered that the dangers arising from foreign invasion in 1837 and 1838 might be repeated, and that the honor and the power of the Empire might be damaged almost as much in Canada as they might be damaged on the shores of Kent, or the coasts of Ireland, we should not have been frightened out of our propriety at the chances of invasion at the beginning of winter; nor would England have been put to so enormous a cost in affording us relief and in imposing respect for her flag on the soil of this Province.

Here let me quote one more paragraph from the Report of the Committee—the last in that report:—“In conclusion, “your Committee submit that the tendency of modern war-“fare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile power; and “it is therefore desirable to concentrate the troops required “for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possi-“ble, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing “against aggression the distant dependencies of the Em-“pire.” From what has been said, it will be seen that this rule, as generally laid down by the Committee does not hold good with regard to Canada. Regarding the United States as the great power, with which Britain is most likely to have the next contest, it may be well for her to consider whether the “heart of that hostile power” may not have to be assailed on the lakes as well as on the ocean. Be this as it may, Canada *must* be defended there; otherwise such a war will inevitably present the spectacle of having her most powerful colony detached from her, whilst she remains mistress of the seas, and holds every Atlantic port of the enemy in close blockade, if not in actual possession.

Permit me to say, that if, in dealing with actual facts, some of my observations presuppose a state of Colonial independence more complete than may be quite agreeable to a high order of sentimentality, the fault is not mine. It is the Colonial policy of the Empire that has done this, and we cannot alter it if we would, and I feel pretty certain that we would not if we could. Provincial statesmen, though they are accused by their opponents of doing all sorts of odd things, will scarcely feel themselves so embarrassed with the responsibilities of independence, as to implore the mother country to take back the troublesome gift. A study of British Colonial blue books has a wonderful desentimentalizing effect. We are there reminded of reciprocal obligations,

interests and duties, and of the doctrine of *quid pro quo*.

Now, let us assume the question to be as you have cleverly put it "how best to consolidate the interests of the colony and the mother country." This subject I apprehend would open up too large a field for discussion at the present time, although I most sincerely hope that the present crisis will powerfully direct the public attention of England to it. The object must, I conceive, be accomplished by enlarging the commercial relations between the two, by building up a great Commercial Marine on the Lakes, the St. Lawrence and the Ocean route between the St. Lawrence and Britain. In the second communication which you did me the favor to publish on the question of defences, I entered somewhat into this part of the subject, and need not again dwell on it.

The question we are now considering is how to develop the largest amount of military spirit and military power in the Province, and I hope, that the suggestions contained in my last letter may not be inappropriate to the occasion. It matters not whether, for the sake of argument, and to get rid of traditional ideas, which often embarrass us in a course of reasoning, we call ourselves Allies, or Colonies, or Provinces of England. I used the term ally, as I pointed out, as being more convenient to express the relations which we should occupy in case of war with the United States. But I proposed to leave the application of the principles and duties which such a relationship *de facto*, would devolve on us mutually, until its necessity arose—until the time came, if ever it should come, when it may be necessary to enter into a convention about quotas and contingents. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof," is a maxim which ought ever to be kept in mind. It may break that charm which you so well allude to, of considering ourselves a part and parcel of the great Empire of Britain, when we have to set down and possibly wrangle, about how many men and how many guns each party ought to keep in the field. Another question, I have said, ought, if possible, never to be raised, namely, on whose account was the war undertaken?

In all our discussions, we ought not to forget that it is our first and highest interest and duty to maintain the most cordial relations with Britain, and second only to those to cultivate similar relations with our neig' rs. By preparing for war, we are simply providing a guarantee for peace, and I venture to say that if we do not court the former by the feebleness of our precautions to preserve the latter, we shall long enjoy that greatest of blessings, an honorable and

undisturbed peace. And let it never be forgotten that whilst we are educating our rising generation in the elements of military science and military duties, we are doing the very best thing to develope both physical and mental energies. Nothing in my judgment will do more to preserve the liberties of the people, than to raise up a class of citizen soldiers, by which means we shall be able to avoid the dangers of a standing army. I trust that I have now shown that we do not in reality differ materially if at all on any point, and feel confident that advantage must result from such discussions.

Yours, &c.,

AN UPPER CANADIAN.

Quebec, 19th February, 1862.

VII.

OUR MILITARY DEFENCES—IS CANADA TO BECOME A PART OF THE UNITED STATES.

SIR,—I venture once again to trespass on your patience and to offer a few additional remarks on a subject, in the discussion of which I have already filled many columns of your paper, without, as I conceive, by any means exhausting it. I do not, however, propose to go over much new ground. My object is rather to sum up what I have already put forward as my view of the duty of the Canadian Legislature. The question to be decided in a few months, perhaps in a few weeks, is one which will determine the future destiny of this great and rising Province for generations, if not for all time to come. That question is, whether we shall grow up to nationality under the congenial influences of British connection and British power, or be speedily absorbed into the Union of the neighboring States, or become united with some detached portion of them?

This will no doubt strike many thinking persons as a bold, if not an exaggerated mode of putting the subject before the public. Others may possibly set me down as an alarmist. It is to prevent such assumptions and meet such charges that I desire to sum up the dangers of the present and the menaces of the future, and to urge on the legislature and the country the necessity of adopting measures for developing the military spirit of the people and bringing out the military resources of the country. Since the adjustment of the *Trent* affair, the public seem to have settled down into a dangerous state of indifference or contempt for what may grow out of the great revolution in progress amongst a neighboring people, fourteen times more numerous, if not fourteen times more powerful, than ourselves. It is only a few brief weeks since we all drew a long and a free breath at the unexpected relief from the apprehension of a war, which we were in no manner prepared to meet; and already we hear it repeated from mouth to mouth, that “the Americans will so exhaust themselves by their own internal strife as to incapacitate them from attacking Canada, or “measuring swords with England. No, no, depend on it,” (we hear it remarked,) “we are now quite safe. The North

"will be beaten in the end, and the independence of the South will afford a guarantee for our safety. If this result is not attained by the South, the war will be long, and we shall in any case be safe—either from exhaustion of our neighbors, or from a divided Union."

Here lies, in my judgment, a serious, if it does not prove a fatal delusion. Whether the Union be restored, or whether it be permanently divided, our risk of attack, at no distant day, remains pretty nearly equal. Indeed it would be difficult to say from which event we may have most to apprehend. If the Union be restored, the United States will be the most powerful and overbearing nation in the world. With a million of men who will have acquired a pretty thorough knowledge of war in the field and in the camp; with a navy, which will have become equal to the defence of her principal sea ports, and with the ocean swarming with privateers to prey on the commerce of England, is there any one who knows anything of American character and American audacity, who dare assert that the United States will hesitate one moment to measure strength with the rival she both hates and fears, but which she nevertheless hopes to humble? Besides the popularity of such a war, can any one doubt the policy of seeking it in order to consolidate the government which just now is shaken with the revolutionary earthquake? The darling doctrine of President Monroe will be at once asserted, and Canada, Cuba and Mexico will be promptly *invited* to join the then irresistible Union.

On the other hand, if there are to be two governments in the place of one, the government of Washington will be compelled to maintain a great standing army, and it may attempt to indemnify itself for the loss of the South by the acquisition of Canada. It by no means follows, because the government of Washington may be unable to subdue eight millions, or twelve millions including the slaves (who do the labor, whilst the whites do the fighting, and who ought, therefore, to count in the military resources of the country) that it may not be able to crush us with only two and a half millions, although backed by all the power of England. Look at the map and there it will be seen that the Confederate States are a great compact country, skirted along the sea coast by a chain of mountains, covering a considerable breadth and extending many hundreds of miles. This country too—larger than all that part of Europe lying west of the Rhine and the Rhone, or rather the mountains of Piedmont, is filled with rivers and other defensive lines, and has a cli-

mate unfavorable to military operations at nearly all seasons of the year. Now look at Canada. Here it lies, a long, narrow, and comparatively sparsely settled country. From the head of Lake Superior to the boundary line of New Brunswick, a distance of more than 2000 miles, is bounded by the territories of this dangerous neighbor.

But we are earnestly reminded of how the brave militia of Upper Canada, with the aid of one or two regiments of the line, drove back the 'Yankees' in the war of 1812-14, when that part of the Province had under 100,000 inhabitants. "If we were able then, with such limited means, to defend ourselves," it is argued by a portion of the press and by gentlemen everywhere, "we shall give good account of "any foe who dares to set foot on our soil. Look at our "population—two and a half millions, and look at our rail- "ways and our steamers, and at the British troops already "in the country and those that will come, when more are "needed, and at the British gunboats," (which may never float on the waters of our lakes) "what more do we need, "than an enrolment of our militia." These are words I have heard very often of late, and those who use them pretty generally do so, deprecating the necessity of additional taxation to provide defences.

Those who can so readily compose themselves into a state of fancied security had better reflect on the result of the American Revolutionary war, as well as on the progress of events since the war of 1812. Did not a larger British force, of the hardiest and finest veteran soldiers Britain ever had—a force larger by half than that now in this country, lay down their arms to three millions of the old Colonists, and five or six thousand French soldiers, after an exhausting war of seven years? And whilst the population of Upper Canada has grown from 100,000 to 1,500,000 has not the population of Western New York and the Western frontier States grown from 400,000 or 500,000 to 8,000,000?* Then

* The population of Ohio and the territories now forming the Western Lake States contained in 1812, in round numbers about 300,000 souls. Of these 230,000 belonged to Ohio alone, and 70,000 to the Western territories.

In 1860 the Western Lake States contained the following population :

Ohio,	2,339,599
Michigan,	749,112
Indiana,	1,350,941
Illinois,	1,711,753
Wisconsin,	775,873
Minnesota,	172,022
	7,099,300

The 30 Western Counties of New York (out of 60 comprising the whole State) contained, in 1812 about 200,000 souls. They had increased in 1860

look at the shipping of our neighbors on the lakes, numbering four to one as compared with ours, and showing in tonnage a still greater disproportion against us. Look at their lines of railway, tapping our frontier everywhere, and the vast material of war they will have on hand when the day of peace amongst themselves arrives. Nor can it be supposed, that in the event of a war with Great Britain, they will again commit the blunders they were guilty of in the last contest, of sending small detachments of men against us at numerous points. Leaving fifty or sixty thousand men to guard their frontier cities of Detroit, Buffalo, Oswego and Ogdensburg, and a score of improvised gunboats manned by a few thousand sailors, to menace our shores of the lakes, and keep our Western militia at home, they will next time send a hundred thousand men against Montreal and fifty thousand against Kingston. The former will endeavor to cut off all succor from England, and the latter to pierce the Province through at a vital part. As for Montreal, if attacked by such a force in winter—a force that can be directed against it with the utmost facility, by the old line of military operations, *via* the Hudson and Mohawk rivers and Lake Champlain, now traversed all the way by iron rails, it can only be defended by an imposing army of the line, backed by all the irregulars of Lower Canada.†

If we are going to provide the means to avert such dangers, it must appear to every sensible man, clear that those means must be proportioned to the end they are to accomplish. In case of actual war, England will, no doubt promptly take our forces into her pay, to an extent to bring our own burthens within our ability to bear them. But we must first provide a force, which may be made so available.

to 1,750,000, Western Pennsylvania, which is also a Lake State, contains fully 750,000. Adding Vermont and Maine, the population of the frontier States will be as follows:

Western Lake States,.....	7,099,300
Western New York,.....	1,750,000
Western Pennsylvania,.....	750,000
Vermont,.....	315,000
Maine,.....	620,000
 Total.....	10,534,300

† If Montreal were held in force by an invading army for six months, thus cutting off all external aid at the point where all our lines of communication meet, it requires no military prescience to see that all British America to the West as far as the Rocky Mountains must fall within six months. With the West gone Lower Canada would no longer be worth holding and must speedily follow.

This is what England asks of us and it is reasonable and just, and I say it is most desirable for the Province that we should do it ourselves; because it will develope the spirit and energy of the people, and qualify us to shape and guide the destinies of the future. But if we are going to be niggardly and offer 20,000 men when 50,000 or more will not be too many for a peace establishment on the voluntary principle, we had better do nothing and leave the future to chance, or to Providence, or to the forbearance of our neighbors. A feeble policy would argue that we are either wanting in will, or are deficient in resources, and the feebleness of our preparations would be regarded as an invitation to detach us from our present Imperial connection.

Yours, &c.,

AN UPPER CANADIAN.

Quebec, 6th March, 1862.

VIII.

OUR DEFENCES—SUGGESTIONS ABOUT ORGANIZING OUR MILI- TARY FORCES.

SIR,—My observations hitherto have been based mainly on leading general principles, such as a layman might be supposed to understand or be able to master. Although the application, or carrying out of such principles in their workable details must necessarily be left to more practical and professional men, I hope that the suggestions I am about to make may advance, in some small degree, the cause which we ought all to be sincerely desirous of aiding—namely, how to provide the most efficient means of bringing out the military spirit of the country, at the least cost in money. Even though very different views, in regard to the peculiar method or organization, may be recommended to Parliament, the observations of persons having access to common sources of information, and having the same objects at heart, may be of some value by affording scope for comparison. At any rate a mere layman may hope to escape severe criticism from those who are qualified by professional knowledge for the exercise of higher efforts of statesmanship and for the suggestion of more practical details

I have favored the volunteer principle, as being calculated to come within our means, and to develop the largest amount of military enthusiasm as well as power in this country. Others I notice, favor a small standing army for Canada. I have seen some detailed estimates for recruiting and maintaining such a force ; but the writers have evidently never looked into an English blue book on this subject, as the figures are absurdly incorrect, and below the mark.

I shall briefly contrast the two descriptions of force. According to the report of the Imperial commissioners of 1860, paragraph 14 the cost of raising recruits for the regular army is £11 and cost of barracks £100 stg. per head. As labor is dearer in Canada than in England we may fairly set down the cost of recruiting at double this sum or at least at \$100 per man. All the Imperial barracks in the Province are required for the Imperial troops. We should therefore have to set to work to build for ourselves, and we cannot hope to

do so at a less cost than those built in England—say \$500 per man—the first cost, therefore, for each soldier will be \$600. Then to this must be added his outfit. This, in England is about £6 stg., covering uniform, rifle, knapsack, cartridge box, and necessary changes of clothing. In Canada we must not count on less than \$50.00 per man, including his winter requirements and camp equipage. To raise and equip 4000 regulars would therefore cost \$2,400,000.

The annual cost of maintenance of British troops in Canada, of all arms, appears from the report of the Committee of the House of Commons on Colonial Expenditure for 1861, page 279 appendix, to be about \$400 per man.

In regard to volunteers, the Imperial Commissioners estimate such a force at only a little over one-twentieth that of regulars—as well in the organization as annually. This of course refers only to the peace establishments; but that is just what this country is called on to provide. When it comes to war England must draw her purse strings, and take all our troops whom we are unable to keep in the field, into her pay. But as we have not the same classes from which to recruit our volunteer army, as the volunteer force of England is drawn from, we must find the men elsewhere. To get them elsewhere we must offer stronger inducements. Instead of merely supplying a musket, or a rifle, the Government must furnish to each man, and to each officer, a full suit of uniform, including a winter great coat and cap—in addition to the rifle and the officer's side-arms. The first outfit of each volunteer may therefore be set down at the same as for a regular—say \$50. But there will be no barracks required, and here we shall save \$500 per head, as also the bounty.

We next want to know what each volunteer will cost per annum. This will depend on the number of days he may be called out for continuous drill and rifle practice. If a week were considered sufficient time and a dollar a day—(including all arms of the service, and officers' pay,) the wages, *per capita*, covering also rations, the cost per man would be \$6 a year, to which must be added \$2 more for munitions of war. Add to all these a round \$100,000 a year for the expenses of the war department and incidentals, and we shall have a pretty fair guide as to comparative expenses. Let us carry the comparison a little further and see how the matter will stand.

I assume that this country ought to provide 50,000 volunteers, to be organized on the best plan that can be devised for efficiency. As there will be no bounties to be paid, the first cost will be \$50 a head—to estimate lower, for an average of all arms, will only be to deceive. This will require an appropriation of \$2,500,000, a sum which, a few years ago, when railways were all the rage, would only have required the dash of the Inspector General's pen to carry through parliament. The annual charge (at \$8 a head) would be \$500,000, the \$100,000 for departmental and incidental expenses being added.

It will thus be seen that the first cost of providing 50,000 volunteers will be less than that of raising, equipping and housing 4,200 regulars, whilst the annual charges on the former will be about equal to the annual maintenance of 1250 of the latter. Those who favor the establishment of a regular force will do well to study the costliness of such a force.

In conclusion of these observations I shall venture to express an opinion as to how and where the volunteer force should be enlisted. To incur a large expenditure in raising men on a wrong principle would be highly impolitic. Those who may desire to enter a volunteer service should be required to hold themselves ready to march at any time they may be called on, and to any part of the Province, and to serve for a period of not less than a year in case of war, or threatened invasion. Such as will not enter on those terms (being provided with pay and rations equal to the United States service,) are not worth having. Possibly not over half of those now drilling in our towns and cities would be able to leave their avocations if asked to do so.

We must therefore look to our agricultural population which constitutes about 80 per cent of the whole, for our volunteer forces. It strikes me that the best mode of distributing this force would be to give to every township or parish the right to raise a company of infantry, cavalry or artillery, of a strength proportionate to its inhabitants. Towns and cities may be better adapted to some branches of the service. If so, let them have such branches. By this arrangement every part of the country will have ocular demonstration of the result of our military organization. The people everywhere will see that the money they are called on to contribute is expended for the object for which it is raised, and it will be spent equally all over the country. Besides, it may reasonably be supposed that the presence in

each locality of a company of uniformed and drilled men, will inspire a certain degree of military spirit amongst all classes and thus add moral weight to the organization.

To carry out this suggestion, the Province might be divided into a certain number of military districts, which may be made to correspond we will say for example, with the 48 electoral divisions of the Legislative Council, or according to any other more convenient method. Each of these might form the territorial limits of a regiment—and four or five of the districts contiguous to each other, might constitute brigade divisions. The annual trainings or week of drill and ball practice would naturally take place at regimental head-quarters, and the volunteers from the mere love of the thing, and to appear in uniform would no doubt meet, without pay for a few hours each month for company exercises.

Here, we are once more brought to think of the question, what are we to do for officers? This I have already answered. Establish military professorships in all our high schools and colleges, on the same principles as other professorships, and let all who desire to obtain a military education have a chance. If instances of professional merit are discovered in any of the schools, let such students be promoted at the public expense to a course of higher education. In a few years we shall thus have the country filled with competent young men to officer our volunteer army. It is not too much to say that every township in the Province might be able to furnish two or three, or more families possessed of the necessary means to qualify some one or more sons for such positions. Meantime we must make the best shifts we can. For instance, it might be made a condition to the issuing of a commission, that the person seeking it should attend a school of instruction, to be improvised for the occasion at some convenient point, for a few weeks or months.

I have now done with the subject for the present, and shall rejoice as much as any man in the country to find, when the Commission on Militia affairs makes its report, that some equally good, or better and more comprehensive scheme of organization and defence has been matured.

Yours, &c.,

AN UPPER CANADIAN.

Quebec, 10th March, 1862.

ADDENDA.

Since this pamphlet was in type the mail brings us the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons confirming the Recommendation of the Report of the Commissioners on Colonial expenditure, to which the writer has so often referred. The resolution was moved by Mr. A. Mills, the Chairman of the Commission, and is in the following words :

“That this House while fully recognizing the claims of all portions of the British empire to imperial aid, in their protection against perils arising from the consequences of imperial policy, is of opinion that colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal order and security ; *that such colonies ought to assist in their external defence ; and that, as a rule, except in the case of great fortresses, no further charge ought to be made upon the imperial treasury for colonial fortifications.*”

The italicized portion was added as an amendment by Mr. Baxter, in order to inform the Colonies more explicitly of the firm determination of the Imperial Government to carry out the recommendation of the Commissioners. Our Legislature, can therefore have no loop-hole out of which to escape from the necessity of providing more efficient means of defence. It is the result of that larger degree of national independence which mother England has devolved upon us, and which we have no alternative but to except.

The following extract from a recent number of the *United Service Magazine* confirms the assumption of the writer that the British forces, sent to aid us in case of war must hereafter be regarded as allies and we as principals in any such contest.

This writer says, “it is plain absolute infatuation to ignore or blink at the fact, that *either we must keep a large army permanently in Canada, occupying in force all the more exposed and important points, or the Canadians themselves must entirely alter the existing state of things, and keep up a regular army* fairly proportionate to the danger that menaces them. Such danger has been arrested for the moment, but it is still there, and in all probability will increase daily. *Our utter incapacity of being the principals in a land defence of Canada*

"ought to be evident enough. If we are to be so, our 11,000 men will need to be doubled or trebled very shortly."

The writer of these letters has not felt it proper to make specific suggestions about the organization of the Militia, or Volunteer forces of the country, or in regard to what points ought to be fortified. To have done so, whilst two Military Boards were in session to whom these questions have been referred, would have been presumption. He cannot, however, allow his observations to go to press in their present form without pointing out two indispensable objects requiring the earliest attention of the Legislature. The first of these is the establishment of a capacious graving dock at Quebec, capable of receiving vessels as large as the *Warrior*. To secure this object, important alike to the Ocean Commerce of Canada, and in case of war, to its military security, all that is required is to afford the necessary facilities to the Quebec Harbor Commissioners to raise a revenue, in the same manner as is done at Montreal and indeed at every other sea-port of any importance in America, or Europe—that is by levying tonnage dues.

The second object, of even greater present importance, is to push forward the completion of the Houses of Parliament at the permanent seat of government, so as to remove all doubts on a question calculated to distract the public mind, and weaken the national sentiment of the country. Concurrently with the progress of these buildings, some iron towers, or fortifications should be designed and constructed. This might be done at a very moderate expense by buying a few thousand tons of old railway bars, which can be had, in any quantity at half the cost of new iron. After the experience of the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac*, it cannot be doubted, that a few such towers mounting heavy artillery, would defend Ottawa against any force that could be sent against it.

Quebec, March 22, 1862.